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Elderly have been increasingly targeted as a group to enhance economic development and 
the tax base in communities. While recent literature on elderly migration tends to focus on 
how elderly migration patterns are influenced by state fiscal variables, the reverse effect from 
elderly population on fiscal variables is very plausible. This paper reexamines the 
intergenerational conflict in education financing using U.S. state and county level data. We 
analyze how preferences for education spending might vary across different elderly age 
groups, an analysis that has not been explored before. We estimate the impact of elderly 
population and elderly migration rates on education spending using panel data and spatial 
econometric techniques. Our results broadly support the presence of intergenerational 
conflict and age heterogeneity in preferences for education spending among elderly migrants. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Retirees are becoming increasingly important for state and local economies and budgets. While 
retirees pose significant fiscal challenges to state and local governments, they may also offer 
opportunities to enhance local economic development. A major factor in the rise of their 
importance is the rapid increase in the number of retired elderly in the U.S. population and its 
fiscal and economic implications. An important consequence of population aging is increasing 
fiscal pressure to spend on social security, health care, and other welfare programs that benefit 
the elderly at the expense of other programs that benefit the young. Population aging can affect 
spending on education through the enhanced political power of the elderly as a voting group. 
Slavov (2006) demonstrates that government expenditures tend to be biased in favor the elderly 
because they are easier to sustain politically across a broad class of majoritarian institutions due 
to asymmetric distribution of benefits that generate broad political support for large transfers to 
older individuals. Since education is a major input to human capital accumulation, aging can 
have a significant negative impact on future economic growth. Recent studies by Gradstein and 
Kaganovich (2004), Holtz-Eakin, Lovely and Tosun (2004), Tosun (2005), Tosun (2008) as well 
as Razin, Sadka, and Swagel (2002) examine the growth implications of the intergenerational 
conflict in education spending, but lead to different conclusions and warrant empirical 
investigation. 
This study presents new evidence on the relationship between education spending and 
population aging building on the original finding by James Poterba (1997) that state K-12 
education spending is negatively related by the share of retirees in state population. Poterba 
(1998) argues that the link between population aging and public education is theoretically 
ambiguous and has to be resolved empirically, but the empirical consensus has not yet emerged. 
For instance, Ladd and Murray (2001) do not find any evidence in support of intergenerational 
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conflict in education spending at the county level, while Harris et al. (2001) do find such 
evidence in school district data. While some studies argue and present evidence that the elderly 
have a strong dislike for education spending (Brunori, 2003; Button, 1992 and Reeder and 
Glasgow, 1990), others do not find strong evidence of such relationship (Rosenbaum and Button, 
1989; Button and Rosenbaum, 1989). By examining the voting behavior in tax referenda in six 
Florida counties, for instance, Button (1992) concludes that intergenerational conflict is very 
prevalent in education-related issues. On the other hand, Deller and Walzer (1993) find a much 
weaker evidence of such generational conflict in a survey of residents in rural Illinois by 
showing that retirees support local education spending, albeit at a lower level than non-retirees. 
Moreover, the 2004 AARP Aging American Voter Survey indicates that a strong majority of 
older people support federal government’s responsibility in educating young people.
1  
  The lack of empirical consensus on the intergenerational conflict may be the result of 
complications created by reverse or simultaneous causality where the elderly can influence 
government policy and also be influenced by it in their migration decisions.
2 Farnham and Sevak 
(2002) provide evidence from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) that households move to 
areas with lower per pupil expenditures and reduce their property tax liability by $115 on 
average. Newbold (1996) investigates the determinants of elderly interstate migration from 1985 
to 1990 and finds that onward migrants are more sensitive to physical amenities than Medicare 
expenditures, for example. Gale and Heath (2000) find that elderly prefer states where wage 
earners carry more of the burden in financing publicly provided goods. On the other hand, 
Conway and Rork (2004, 2006) find that elderly migration is likely to cause or influence changes 
                                                           
1 However, the survey did not have a similar question for state and local governments. The same survey shows that a 
large group of older people became more conservative in issues such as bureaucracy and taxes. See AARP (2004) 
for a summary of findings from this survey. 
2 Studies by Cebula (1990), Conway and Houtenville (1998, 2001), Conway and Rork (2004, 2006), and Farnham 
and Sevak (2002) explore these reverse causality issues. 
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in state tax policy rather than be influenced by them. Similarly, Voss et al. (1988) determine that 
state “death” taxes do not contributed to elderly out-migration. 
The empirical evidence on the intergenerational conflict is further complicated by the fact 
that it is not only the size of the elderly population but also their migration patterns and age 
heterogeneity in preferences that could have different implications for education spending. 
According to the U.S. Census report by He and Schachter (2003) on migration patterns of the 
elderly between 1995 and 2000, the mobility of older population differ significantly by age, sex 
and region. For example, the young old (people 65 to 74 years old) were more likely to move to 
a different state compared to the older old, particularly the oldest old (people 85 years and over). 
In addition the population 55 to 64 years old had mobility patterns similar to the young old group 
(people 65 to 74 years old). Hence, it is particularly useful to examine the migration effects of 
this near retirement group (some already retired) in addition to the older age groups as we do in 
this paper. 
By addressing the problem of reverse causality, differentiating between migration and the 
share of elderly population, and controlling for age heterogeneity in preferences, this study aims 
to provide more authoritative evidence on the intergenerational conflict first examined by 
Poterba (1997). We use Conway and Rork’s (2006) panel-data approach in addressing the 
reverse causality problem that complicates the estimation of the relationship between state fiscal 
policy and elderly migration. In addition to using a longitudinal panel of the U.S. states, we also 
test for the presence of intergenerational conflict using county-level data and find similar 
evidence. Controlling for spatial autocorrelation at the county level, we also show how the effect 
of retiree migration on education spending varies across different age groups of retirees.  
The paper is structured as follows. The next section briefly discusses possible taxing and 
spending changes amid elderly in-migration. The paper then discusses the empirical strategy and 
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methodology in section 3. Section 4 presents results from state and county level regressions. The 
last section contains our concluding remarks. 
 
2.  Rising Old-Age Dependency and Preferred Taxing and Spending 
One important consequence of substantial elderly in-migration is the increasing political power 
of the elderly. Table 1 gives an overview of the political weight of elderly as a voting group 
using voting statistics compiled by the U.S. Census Bureau. The age group 18 to 24 had the 
fewest registered voters (38.2 percent) and the least number to vote (17.2 percent), in 2002. With 
an increase in age, the percentage registered and voted also increased. Sixty-one percent over 
eighteen years of age were registered to vote and 42.3 percent actually voted in 2002. Age 
groups below 45 years of age fell below this average in both categories. However, in the 45 to 54 
years category there are 67.4 percent registered and 50.2 percent voted. The largest percent 
registered was in the 75 to 84 age category with 76.9 percent, and this group also had the second 
highest turnout with 61.9 percent voting in 2002. The 65 to 74 age category had the highest 
voting percentage with 63.1 percent. 
To illustrate the possible impact of the political power of the elderly on education 
spending, one can use a median voter model within an overlapping generations growth model. At 
each period of the model, a cohort of size Nt is born. Then total population in each period is 
 where  t t N N + −1 ( ) 1 1 tt N − =+ η t N  and  t η  is the population growth rate at period t. Given this, 
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where a is the ability and m is the ability level of the median voter. This in turn can be used to 
show 










which is positive under a uniform ability distribution. With more elderly in the population, the 
median voter becomes a person with lower ability and the preferred tax rate and education 
spending of the median voter is lower. The intuition behind this is as follows: as the elderly 
population increases through in-migration, old-age dependency ratio rises and older people will 
need fewer young voters to form a majority. These young voters are the ones at the lower end of 
the ability distribution. They prefer lower taxes and spending than higher ability counterparts 
because their return from public education is lower. While we don’t discuss the other aspects of 
the model, Tosun (2003), Holtz-Eakin, Lovely and Tosun (2004) and Tosun (2008) show that 
this political economy effect is weighed against the growth effect which exerts a reverse positive 
pressure on the government spending on education through a positive income elasticity of 
government spending. Hence, in an overlapping-generations growth model with a political 
process for taxation and education spending, the effect of elderly migrants on education spending 
is ambiguous and must be resolved empirically. 
 
3.  Empirical Methodology 
 
In this section, we examine the empirical evidence on the intergenerational conflict in education 
financing and expand previous empirical methodology to account for elderly migration and 
spatial dependence. We follow Poterba’s (1997) basic empirical model specification for the state 
and county level regressions, but we improve upon Poterba’s analysis by utilizing panel data and 
spatial econometric techniques. In addition, we are able to examine richer elderly migration data 
at the county level due to available data for several elderly age groups from 55 years old and 
over. We use Poterba’s (1997) basic empirical model specification for the state level regressions: 
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it it it it it
it it it it Y
ε β β β β
β β β β β
  + + +   +   +
  +   + +   + = 1 0
OUTMIG65 INMIG65 URBAN     NONWHITE
OWNERS   OLD     KID           ED/CHILD
8 7 6 5
4 3 2 it  (3)   
Where ED/CHILD is the logarithm of per pupil government spending on K-12 education, Y is 
the logarithm of real state per capita personal income, KID is the logarithm of the state 
population shares aged 0 to 15, OLD is the logarithm of the state population shares aged 65 and 
over, OWNERS is the logarithm of the population share that owns homes, NONWHITE is the 
logarithm of the population share that is nonwhite, and URBAN is the logarithm of the 
population share that lives in urban areas.
3 We extend Poterba’s (1997) basic model to include 
the logarithms of in-migration and out-migration rates for people 65 years old and over 
(INMIG65 and OUTMIG65, respectively). These variables are calculated as total in-migrants or 
out-migrants divided by total state population in a given year. Our state dataset is a balanced 
panel that includes observations for each state (except for Alaska and Hawaii) in years 1970, 
1980, 1990, and 2000 amounting to 192 observations in total. Nominal values of per capita 
personal income and education spending per pupil are deflated using GDP deflator obtained from 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Tables 2 and 3 provide the descriptive statistics for the state 
and county level data used in our regressions. Table 4 gives the data sources and web links for 
the data. 
Due to significant correlation between KID, OLD, and Y variables at the state level, their 
coefficient estimates are likely to be biased and difficult to infer from. Moreover, Conway and 
Rork (2006) find evidence suggesting that elderly migration determines state tax policy and not 
the other way around. For this and other reasons, we believe that elderly migration variables are 
better suited than elderly population shares for capturing the effect of intergenerational 
competition on education spending. Thus, we reexamine the intergenerational conflict by 
                                                           
3 Due to the data availability constraints, our database omits the federal aid and poverty variables used in Poterba’s 
(1997) regressions. Also, our KID variable is different from Poterba’s variable defined as the logarithms of the state 
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including elderly migration rates in both state and county regressions. Like Poterba (1997), we 
expect the OWNERS variable to capture the after-tax price of education spending and the 
URBAN variable to capture the differences in the cost of delivering school services as a function 
of the spatial distribution of population or potential taste differences for public spending between 
urban and rural residents. Poterba (1997) points out the difficulty of interpreting the coefficient 
for NONWHITE because it may proxy not only for the racial mix effect on education spending 
but also for higher moments of the income distribution. 
We use the same basic econometric model as shown in equation (3) in our county level 
regressions as well. However, there are a few important differences about the county dataset that 
are worth mentioning. Unlike the state dataset, the county dataset is just a cross-section of 
counties from 48 continental United States and the District of Columbia where all variables are 
the same as in the state dataset except for a more detailed age-group breakdown of elderly 
migration rates. Our elderly migrants are grouped in the following age categories: 55-64, 65-74, 
75-84, and 85 and older. Our elderly in and out migration rates are calculated as in-migration or 
out-migration flows during 1995-2000 divided by county population in 1995 and come from the 
Census 2000 PUMS dataset. By using migration data prior to 2003, we hope to eliminate the 
simultaneous causality problem between education spending and migration. The county dataset 
has at least two advantages over the state dataset. With 2957 observations, it is significantly 
larger than the state dataset containing only 192 observations. Plus, our county dataset contains 
migration variables for four distinct age groups. We believe that the biggest advantage of the 
county dataset is its ability to examine the heterogeneity of preferences for education across 
different elderly age groups, which is probably the most novel aspect of this paper. The county-
level analysis has its challenges as well as its benefits. In Poterba’s (1997, p.5) own words: 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
population shares aged 5 to 17. We do not find these specification differences alarming (our basic model passes link 
and Ramsey specification tests) and our findings resemble those of Poterba. 
  7   
One drawback of analyzing state-level data on spending and demographics is that many of the 
critical decisions on spending levels are made by voters in local jurisdictions. State average 
spending levels therefore conceal substantial heterogeneity within states. Studying local 
jurisdictions brings a different set of empirical problems, because the demographic composition of 
a small community cannot be viewed as exogenous, but rather depends on the structure of local 
public spending. This can make it impossible to generalize from the local level relationship 
between demographic structure and spending patterns to broader based changes. 
 
We attempt to address a number of challenging econometric issues in our state and county level 
regressions. In addition to examining the heterogeneity of preferences for education spending 
across age groups, we improve upon earlier studies by subjecting our estimates to a variety of 
advanced econometric techniques at different levels of aggregation (i.e. state vs. county). To 
account for the potential influence of state-specific and time-specific factors and omitted 
variables on our estimates, we use state and time fixed effects modeled as  it t i it σ τ δ ε + + = . We 
also utilize a number of econometric techniques that address potential autocorrelation, 
heteroskedasticity, endogeneity, outlier, and spatial dependence issues that could make empirical 
estimates biased and inconsistent. 
  Spatial dependence is a serious concern in the type of data that involve interstate (or 
intercounty) comparisons. Cliff and Ord (1981) and Anselin (1988) pioneered these models to 
control for any direct influence of spatial neighbors, spillover effects, and externalities generated 
between cross-sectional observations. Failing to address spatial dependence may lead to biased, 
inefficient, and/or inconsistent coefficient estimates. Elhorst (2003) explains in detail the panel 
data spatial error and spatial lag models.
4 Spatial dependence is likely to be present in situations 
when states, for example, engage in some form of “yardstick” competition in taxation or 
government spending on highways, healthcare, education, and other public services and 
infrastructure. States are often forced to compete for businesses and migrants in their quest for 
greater economic wealth and better standards of living. Much of the research on interstate 
competition has focused on taxation and to a much lesser extent, unfortunately, on government 
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spending.
5 Yet, the limited number of existing studies on interstate competition in public services 
finds that states increase their spending on education, highways, healthcare, and welfare in 
response to spending increases by their neighbors.
6 Given Case, Hines and Rosen’s (1993) 
finding of strategic spatial interaction in education spending between neighboring states, we 
argue that Poterba’s (1997) basic econometric model shown in equation (3) should be augmented 
with spatial effects. States or counties that engage in some sort of “copycat” behavior (a la 
Baicker 2005) or “yardstick” competition in education spending would be better characterized by 
a spatial lag model in which each state (county) spending depends on spending by its neighbors. 
Equation (4) features the spatial lag or spatial autoregressive model (SAM) specification that 
uses maximum likelihood (ML) estimation of the spatial lag component without which the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates for β would be biased and inconsistent. 
it it it it it
it it it it Y W
ε β β β β
β β β β ρ β
  + + +   +   +
  +   + +   + + = 1 0
OUTMIG65 INMIG65 URBAN     NONWHITE
OWNERS   OLD     KID   ) ED/CHILD (         ED/CHILD
8 7 6 5
4 3 2 it it  (4)   
Where W is the spatial weight (contiguity) matrix, ρ is the spatial dependence coefficient, and 
W(ED/CHILDit) is a spatially lagged explanatory variable. 
  A different type of spatial dependence could also be present in the relationship we are 
trying to estimate. Spatial dependence that occurs due to spatially correlated omitted variables, 
spatially correlated aggregate variables or spatially correlated errors in variable measurements is 
different from spatially lag dependence and should be modeled accordingly. Equation (5) 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
4 We use MATLAB routines of spatial error model (SEM), spatial autoregressive model (SAR), and spatial Durbin 
model (SDM) which can be downloaded from LeSage’s web site www.spatial-econometrics.com.  
5 For studies on interstate tax competition see Case (1993), Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998), Brueckner and Saavedra 
(2001), Buettner 2001, Revelli (2001), Rork (2003), and Conway and Rork (2004). 
6 Figlio et al. (1999), Saavedra (2000), and Baicker (2005) find evidence of competition in state spending on health 
and public welfare, while Case, Hines and Rosen (1993) find evidence of competition in aggregate as well as 
specific state expenditures on education, health care, and highways. On the contrary, Bruce et al. (2006) find 
evidence suggesting that states free-ride on positive spillover from infrastructure improvements by other states, 
which leads to a negative response to an increase in a neighbor’s spending on infrastructure. 
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features the spatial error model (SEM) specification that uses ML estimation of the spatial error 
term without which the OLS estimates of β would be inefficient.  
it it it it it
it it it it Y
ε β β β β
β β β β β
  + + +   +   +
  +   + +   + = 1 0
OUTMIG65 INMIG65 URBAN     NONWHITE
OWNERS   OLD     KID           ED/CHILD
8 7 6 5
4 3 2 it    (5) 
All the variables here are as previously defined except for  it ε , which now equals to  it it u W + ε λ , 
where W is the spatial weight (contiguity) matrix, λ is the spatial dependence coefficient, and u is 
a vector of homoskedastic errors. We use a row-standardized contiguity matrix computed from 
latitude and longitude coordinates of geographic neighbors. In a row-standardized matrix the 
rows sum up to one and allows the spatial effects to be interpreted as the change in the “average” 
neighbor. Both spatial error (SEM) and spatial autoregressive lag (SAM) models are going to be 




4.  Empirical Results 
 
First, we present our state-level regression results, which are then followed by county-level 
results. Shown in Table 5 are our empirical estimates of the determinants of state K-12 education 
spending. The first (basic) OLS regression in Table 5 shows that higher real per capita income, 
homeownership rate, and share of population under 15 are positively and significantly related to 
education spending per pupil, while share of nonwhite population is negatively and significantly 
related to education spending per pupil. Although the coefficients for per capita income, 
homeownership, and nonwhite population have the expected signs, the coefficient for population 
under 15 does not, albeit being significantly different from zero only at 90% confidence level. 
Moreover, the coefficient for population 65 and over is positive, but not significantly different 
from zero. These results are not consistent with either the intergenerational conflict or Poterba’s 
  10   
(1997) findings. As discussed previously, the estimates for these variables could be biased and 
inconsistent due to being significantly correlated with each other (see the correlation matrix in 
Table 6). Therefore, we argue that migration variables can be better suited for examining the 
intergenerational conflict. In fact, the first OLS regression in Table 5 yields the expected 
negative and statistically significant coefficient for in-migration rate for population 65 years old 
and over plus the expected positive and statistically significant coefficient for out-migration rate 
for population 65 years old and over. According to these estimates, an inflow of elderly migrants 
lowers, and outflow of elderly migrants raises, state K-12 education spending per pupil. These 
estimates are supportive of the intergenerational conflict presence in education financing. To 
provide robustness, we use several different estimation techniques.
7
The second OLS regression in Table 5 incorporates two-way (state and time) fixed 
effects, which are preferred to a random effects regression as suggested by the Hausman test we 
performed. The two-way fixed effects OLS regression yields the expected signs for per capita 
income, population under 15 and over 65, and nonwhite population. However, the coefficients 
for population under 15 and over 65 are not significantly different from zero and the coefficient 
estimate for the elderly in-migration rate is now unexpectedly positive and statistically 
significant, while out-migration rate is positive and significant as expected. While the second 
(two-way fixed effects) regression improves upon the first one in terms of explanatory power, its 
estimates are likely to suffer from panel level heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation problems. 
We address these issues by specifying a panel specific heteroskedastic and first-order 
autoregressive error structure in the next regression (FGLS with two-way fixed effects) in Table 
5. The FGLS estimates, however, do not improve dramatically over the second OLS estimates 
and reveal the existence of the “same-sign” problem for the in and out migration rates, which 
                                                           
7 We perform link and Ramsey RESET tests of omitted variable bias and find that the basic model specification for 
the state level regression in Equation 13 was not rejected by both of these tests at the 95% confidence level. 
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should have the opposite signs according to the intergeneration conflict theory. The “same-sign” 
problem is not unique to our paper and has plagued past elderly migration studies such as Serow 
et al. (1986), Fournier et al. (1988), Conway and Houtenville (2001, 2003), and more recently 
Conway and Rork (2006).  
We attempt to address the “same-sign” problem in our next regression. This problem 
could be the result of the endogeneity bias. It could be argued that state fiscal policies that are 
favorable towards retirees, such as lower K-12 education spending, can induce more elderly 
migration that will be reflected in the share of elderly population. In turn, due to high rates of 
elderly electoral participation, retirees can have a significant influence on state fiscal policy in 
general and education spending in particular. This is analogous to the “which came first, chicken 
or the egg?” argument. Conway and Rork (2006) identify the same issue in their paper in which 
they argue that the percentage of elderly population could reflect past state tax policy and 
migration decisions. Like Conway and Rork (2006), we address this problem by using 10-year 
lags of elderly migration rates in the next FGLS regression.
8 The second FGLS regression with 
two-way fixed effects (Table 5) and lagged migration rates yields the expected relationships 
between education spending and its determinants. Namely, per capita income, homeownership, 
and lagged elderly out-migration have a significant positive effect on K-12 education spending 
per pupil, while nonwhite population, population under 15 and over 65, and lagged elderly in-
migration have a significant negative effect. Not only shares of population under 25 and over 65, 
but also in and out elderly migration rates have the expected signs and statistical significance in 
                                                           
8 Although 10-year lags indicating the existence of 10-year relationships between migration rates and current 
education spending may appear to be far fetched, the fact that amenities, which are virtually fixed, rather than taxes 
(as found by Conway and Rork 2006) appear to be the most important determinants of migration should also give 
credence to their long run (10 and more years) determination of migration patterns and their effects on state policies. 
We also use more recent lags of migration rates in county regressions due to better data availability and find similar 
results. 
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this regression. This evidence provides strong support for the existence of the intergenerational 
conflict in education financing.
9
In the next two regressions, with two-way fixed effects, we address the detected spatial 
error and spatial lag effects that could potentially bias previous non-spatial regression estimates. 
We present the regression results from SAM and SEM models for comparison purposes in Table 
5. Both SAM and SEM regressions indicate that there is significant spatial dependence of both 
types (ρ for spatial lag and λ for spatial error). As can be seen in Table 5, SAM and SEM 
regressions yield very similar estimates for most variables, but some differences exist 
nevertheless. For instance, the SAM regression yields a negative coefficient for population over 
65 (as expected), while the SEM regression yields a positive coefficient for the same variable. 
Both coefficient estimates are not significantly different from zero, however. The SEM 
regression also yields a negative and statistically significant (as expected) coefficient for the 
lagged elderly in-migration rate, while the SAM regression yields a negative but not statistically 
significant coefficient for the same variable. Finally, both SAM and SEM regressions yield a 
positive and significant coefficient for the lagged elderly out-migration rate. Although both SAM 
and SEM estimates appear to support the intergenerational conflict in education financing, we 
recommend using SAM for inference because it is more theoretically consistent with the 
intergenerational hypothesis examined in this paper and is favored over SEM by the Lagrange 
multiplier test. 
  In the next set of regressions (Table 7), we examine the effect of age heterogeneity in 
elderly migrants on 2003 education spending using county level data. We use in and out 
migration flows for the 1995-2000 period divided by 1995 county population for the following 
                                                           
9 We also run a dynamic Arellano-Bond GMM regression where in and out elderly migration rates are treated as 
endogenous variables and are instrumented with their own lags. The Arellano-Bond GMM regression yields a 
negative and significant coefficient for in-migration variable and positive but insignificant coefficient for out-
migration variable. These estimates agree with the intergenerational conflict in education financing argument. 
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age groups: 55-64, 65-74, 75-84, 85 and older. A priori, we expect the 55-64 and 65-74 age 
groups to have similar preferences for education spending since these two groups appear to be 
similar in their migration (see Table 8) and retirement decisions. These two age groups are more 
likely to have grandchildren (or even children) who are in primary and secondary schools 
compared to the older age groups (75 and over).  The older age groups may derive limited 
benefits from education and choose to directly not support education policy through voting or 
indirectly through fiscal pressure.  Therefore, the in-migrants in 55-64 and 65-74 age groups may 
support education spending more relative to in-migrants in 75-84 and 85 and over age groups.  
We expect in-migrants to have a negative effect and out-migrants to have a positive effect but 
with variation in magnitude and significance across age groups.  The expected overall effect of 
elderly migrants 65 years old and over is ambiguous due to the age heterogeneity in preferences 
for education among elderly migrants.  The overall effect depends on the relative strength of 
each age group, which makes our county-level regressions complimentary to our state-level 
regressions.  State level data can yield ambiguous results due to aggregation not addressing the 
issue of age heterogeneity in preferences for education spending among elderly migrants.
10 We 
also address the potential endogeneity bias in our county level regressions by using more recent 
data than in the state regressions lagged migration rates, which occur prior to the 2003 share of 
elderly population and education spending per pupil figures. 
 We  estimate  the spatial lag (SAM), spatial error (SEM), and spatial Durbin (SDM) 
models to determine which ones are going to produce the most reliable estimates to be ultimately 
reported. All three models produce generally similar estimates for the elderly migration variables 
and show the existence of significant spatial dependence. However, not all three models are 
equally suited for inference. The SDM model, for example, is prone to multicollinearity problem 
                                                           
10 Poterba (1997) notes that cross-country data does not suggest an obvious relationship between the share of the 
elderly in the population and the share of government spending devoted to the elderly or to children. 
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in our case. The SEM model, which is estimated via maximum likelihood in this paper, can 
mistakenly misinterpret the spatial lag component ρ from the SAM model as the spatial error 
component λ from the SEM model (Anselin 1988, LeSage 1999). The SEM model may also 
produce results that are significantly different from the bench mark OLS results if the specified 
model has some omitted variable bias, which is the common problem in virtually all empirical 
studies. In our case, the SEM, SAM, and OLS estimates are fairly similar with respect to the 
main variables of interest. Moreover, our Lagrange multiplier tests have shown a preference for 
the SAM model, which is more prevalent in other empirical studies and more theoretically 
consistent with the intergeneration conflict hypothesis. Hence, we consider our SAM estimates to 
be most suitable for inference and present only SAM estimates in Table 7 due to space 
limitations. 
The first regression in Table 7 shows that in-migration of 55-64 year olds has a negative 
but insignificant effect on education county spending per pupil, while out-migration of 55-64 
year olds has a positive and significant effect.  This regression also shows that per capita income 
increases county education spending per pupil, while homeownership and urban population 
decrease it. Interestingly, population under 15 has a significant negative effect on education 
spending, but population over 65 has no statistically significant effect. The second regression in 
Table 7 shows the effect of elderly migrants ages 65 to 74 on education spending. This 
regression also shows that per capita income and out-migration of 65-74 year olds have a 
significant positive effect on education spending per pupil, while in-migration of 65-74 year 
olds, population under 15, homeownership, and urban population have a significant negative 
effect. The third regression featuring the migrants 75-85 years old shows similar results for all 
variables.  It should be noted that the negative in migration effect and the positive out migration 
effect becomes much larger for this age group (elasticities of 6.5% and 5.4%, respectively). The 
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next regression featuring the migrants 85+ years yields the same large negative and statistically 
significant result for in migration while out-migration is positive but insignificant. 
The last two regressions in Table 7 feature the average migration rates for 55+ and 65+ 
age groups. The results for the migrants 55 years old and over show that in-migration is 
negatively and significantly related to education spending, while out-migration is significantly 
and positively related to education spending per pupil.  The results for the migrants 65 years old 
and over yield no surprises and show that in-migrating retirees in that age group, on average, 
reduce education spending per pupil and out migration increases education spending per pupil. 
Contrasting the magnitudes of the coefficients for in-migration and out-migration rates across 
these two groups show that support for education spending appears to decrease with age. This 
result suggests that as retirees become older they prefer less K-12 education spending than 
younger retirees, supporting heterogeneity of preferences for education spending among retirees. 
  Altogether, our empirical analysis at the state and county level reveals significant 
evidence supporting the presence of intergenerational conflict in the U.S. K-12 education 
financing. Namely, it appears that elderly migrants generally lead to a reduction in education 
spending in the areas they move to. These results persist regardless of whether the net in-
migration or in and out migration rates are used in the regressions. However, we find that some 
control variables change their signs and significance levels across estimation techniques and 
datasets making their effects on education spending difficult to interpret. The negative 
coefficient for the homeownership rate, albeit being contrary to Poterba’s (1997) estimates, 
makes sense if one views the estimated equation as the demand schedule for education and the 
homeownership rate (in Poterba’s own view) as the after-tax price of education. In other words, 
our results suggest an intuitive relationship: if the tax price of education rises, quantity demanded 
falls. The share of nonwhites in total population shows up consistently negative and often 
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significant in our state level regressions, but is positive and insignificant in the county-level 
regressions. Finally, the negative coefficient for the share of urban residents in total population 
suggests that urban areas spend less on education perhaps due to economies of scale or lower 
transportation costs (which can account for a substantial portion of education expenditures). 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we reexamine intergenerational conflict in education financing using several 
advanced econometric techniques that are applied to U.S. state and county data on education 
spending and elderly migration. Our findings broadly support the existence of the 
intergenerational conflict in education spending and are robust to the existence of different forms 
of spatial dependence, heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, outliers, endogeneity bias, fixed 
effects and random effects.  
The state-level regression results support the intergenerational conflict in the U.S. 
education financing found by Poterba (1997) and other researchers. Using a balanced panel of 48 
contiguous states for 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000, we show that states with higher share of 
elderly population and higher elderly migration experienced lower education spending per pupil. 
In the next set of regressions, we examine the impact of age heterogeneity among elderly 
migrants on education financing using county-level data. We find that in-migration of age groups 
65 and older decreases education spending, but in-migration of people 75 years old and over 
decreases it at a much larger extent. The overall effect of retiree (65 years old and over) in-
migration on education spending per pupil is negative and significant. Likewise, the out-
migration of retirees (65 years old and over) has a positive effect on education spending per pupil 
that more than cancels out the negative in-migration effect. Our results also show that the 
magnitude of the negative effects on education spending from elderly in-migration and positive 
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effects from elderly out-migration increase with age.  These results broadly support the existence 
of a government failure where concentrated benefits shift towards the elderly due to migration 
patterns.    
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Table 1: Voting Statistics in November 2002, Total U.S. 
(in thousands) 
   Total Population 
    Reported Registered  Reported Voted 
Age Total  Number Percent  Number  Percent 
18 to 24 years  27,377  10,470  38.2  4,697  17.2 
25 to 34 years  38,512  19,339  50.2  10,450  27.1 
35 to 44 years  43,716  26,214  60.0  17,569  40.2 
45 to 54 years  40,043  27,006  67.4  20,088  50.2 
55 to 64 years  26,881  19,424  72.3  15,432  57.4 
65 to 74 years  17,967  13,681  76.1  11,339  63.1 
75 to 84 years  12,287  9,446  76.9  7,600  61.9 
18 years and over  210,421 128,154  60.9  88,903  42.3 
65 year and over  30,254  23,127  76.4  18,939  62.6 
85 year and over  3,640  2,573  70.7  1,729  47.5 
75 years and over  15,925  12,020  75.5  9,328  58.6 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, November 2002. 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for the Data Used in State Level Regressions 
  Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Real education spending per pupil  192  5,048  2,069 
Real per capita personal income  192  20,630  6,279 
Share of population under 15  192  0.24 0.04 
Share of population 65 and over  192  0.12 0.02 
Homeownership rate  192  0.67 0.05 
Share of nonwhite population  192  0.14 0.10 
Share of urban population  192  0.68 0.15 
In-migration rate for population 65 and older  192  0.06 0.05 
Out-migration rate for population 65 and older  192  0.05 0.02 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for the Data Used in County Level Regressions 
  Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Education spending per pupil  2957  8,959  2,158 
Per capita personal income  2957  24,685  5,051 
Share of population under 15  2957  0.20  0.03 
Share of population over 65  2957  0.15  0.04 
Homeownership rate  2957  0.75  0.07 
Share of nonwhite population  2957  0.12  0.15 
Share of urban population  2957  0.40  0.30 
In-migration rate for population 65 and older  2957  0.0076  0.0067 
Out-migration rate for population 65 and older  2957  0.0076  0.0068 
In-migration rate for population 55-64 years old  2957  0.0072  0.0079 
Out-migration rate for population 55-64 years old  2957  0.0051  0.0054 
In-migration rate for population 65-74 years old  2957  0.0039  0.0040 
Out-migration rate for population 65-74 years old  2957  0.0034  0.0034 
In-migration rate for population 75-84 years old  2957  0.0023  0.0023 
Out-migration rate for population 75-84 years old  2957  0.0027  0.0028 
In-migration rate for population 85 and older  2957  0.0014  0.0015 
Out-migration rate for population 85 and older  2957  0.0016  0.0021 
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Table 4: Data Sources and Links 
Variables Source 
State education spending 
per pupil 
United States Census Bureau: Statistical Abstracts of the United States 
http://www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/statab.html
County education 
spending per pupil 
United States Census Bureau: Public Education Finance Report 2003 
http://www.census.gov/govs/www/school03.html
State per capita personal 
income 
Bureau of Economic Analysis 
http://www.bea.gov/bea/regional/spi/
County per capita 
personal income 
Bureau of Economic Analysis 
http://www.bea.gov/bea/regional/reis/
All state population data  United States Census Bureau: Statistical Abstracts 
http://www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/statab.html
All county population 
data 
United States Census Bureau: Population Estimates 
http://www.census.gov/popest/estimates.php
State homeownership rate 





United States Census Bureau: Population Estimates 
http://www.census.gov/popest/housing/files/HU-EST2004-CO.csv
State elderly migration 
rates 
United States Census Bureau: Statistical Abstracts 
http://www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/statab.html
County elderly migration 
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Table 5: Determinants of State K-12 Education Spending per Pupil  
(Standard errors reported in parenthesis) 
Estimation OLS  OLS  FGLS  FGLS  SAM  SEM 
Two-way fixed 
effects  - Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 







(0.946)  -  - 
 



























































































(0.030)  - - - 
Out-migration rate, 






(0.038)  - - - 
Lag of in-migration 
rate, population 
over 65 








population over 65 






ρ -  -  -  -  0.227*** 
(0.026)  - 
λ -  -  -  -  -  0.263*** 
(0.100) 
R
2 0.89 0.96  -  -  0.95 0.95 
Observations 192  192  192  144 144 144 
Notes: Dependent variable: education spending per capita in real dollars. Significance level: *** at 1%, ** at 5%, * 
at 10%. The sample is a balanced panel of 48 continental United States (excluding Alaska and Hawaii) for the years 
1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000. All variables are in logarithms. Robust standard errors are used to control for 
heteroskedasticity. Robust and median regressions that are resistant to outlier bias show similar results. The 
Hausman test rejected the random effects estimator in favor of the fixed effects estimator. In and out migration lags 
are lagged in 10-year intervals due to data availability. Both spatial lag (SAM) and spatial error (SEM) models are 
estimated using maximum likelihood, where ρ and λ are spatial lag and spatial error components, respectively. 
Using net in-migration rates instead of in and out migration rates yield similar results. 
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Table 6: Correlation Matrix for State Regression Variables 
  
Education 







Nonwhite   Home 







Education  exp./pupil         1       
Income  0.9329* 1           
        
      
       
     
     
Share of people 15 
and younger  -0.7821* -0.7953* 1
Share of people 65 
and older  0.5017* 0.4428* -0.7082* 1
Nonwhite -0.0376 -0.0897 -0.021 0.2042* 1
Home  owner 0.2146* 0.2963* -0.2511* -0.0359 -0.2121* 1
Urban 0.2290* 0.3470* -0.0704 -0.072 -0.2646* 0.2679* 1
In-migration 65+  0.0052 0.0507 -0.0496 -0.1669* 0.0039 0.0432 0.1448* 1  
Out-migration 65+  0.2014* 0.2167* -0.0662 -0.1580* -0.2336* -0.1554* 0.1608* 0.5945* 1
















    
  25
Table 7: Determinants of County K-12 Education Spending per Pupil 
(Standard errors reported in parenthesis) 
Estimation  SAM  SAM SAM SAM SAM SAM 
Migration  Ages  55-64  65-74  75-84  85+ 55+ 65+ 


































































































































R-squared  0.10  0.11 0.11 0.10 0.14 0.12 
Notes: Dependent variable: education spending per pupil in 2003. Significance level: *** at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%. 
The sample consists of observations for counties from 48 continental United States (excluding Alaska and Hawaii) 
and District of Columbia in 2003. Missing and incorrect data observations were dropped from the sample resulting 
in a total of 2952 observations. All variables are in logarithms. County in and out migration rates are computed by 
dividing respective migration flows during 1995-2000 by county population in 1995. By using earlier years for our 
migration variable we essentially lag our migration rates in order to eliminate potential simultaneous causality 
problem from 2003 education spending. The spatial lag model (SAM), also known as spatial autoregressive model 
or SAR, is estimated using maximum likelihood, where ρ is the spatial lag component. Using net in-migration rates 
instead of in and out migration rates yield similar results. 
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Table 8: Correlation Matrix for County Regression Variables 
  
Education  









Nonwhite  Home 
















Education  exp./pupil  1  
Income 0.2592* 1  
Share of people 15 
and younger  -0.2015* -0.03 1  
Share of people 65 
and older  0.1003* -0.1145* -0.5842* 1  
Nonwhite    -0.1610* -0.0400* 0.3114* -0.3896* 1
Home owner  -0.0676* -0.2081* -0.1606* 0.3229* -0.3217* 1  
Urban 0.0222 0.4231* 0.2983* -0.4323* 0.3115* -0.5696* 1
In-migration (55-64)  0.0064 -0.0532* -0.1688* 0.1183* -0.0426* 0.1793* -0.1666* 1
In-migration (65-74)  -0.0076 -0.0477* -0.1724* 0.1817* -0.0400* 0.1642* -0.1200* 0.8919* 1
In-migration (75-84)  -0.0172 0.0457* -0.1161* 0.1332* -0.0537* 0.0996* -0.0405* 0.6944* 0.7234* 1
In-migration (85+)  -0.0036 0.0424* -0.1273* 0.1983* -0.1082* 0.0716* -0.0898* 0.3439* 0.3477* 0.4368* 1
In-migration (65+)  -0.0114 -0.0030 -0.1729* 0.2006* -0.0674* 0.1495* -0.1066* 0.8553* 0.9312* 0.8818* 0.5889* 1
Out-migration (55-64)  0.0670* 0.0753* -0.0356 -0.0075 -0.0412* -0.0020 -0.0176 0.7573* 0.7029* 0.7091* 0.3453* 0.7473*
Out-migration (65-74)  0.0679* 0.0037 -0.1271* 0.1450* -0.0902* 0.0821* -0.0978* 0.7167* 0.6936* 0.6760* 0.3218* 0.7249*
Out-migration (75-84)  0.0550* -0.0445* -0.1965* 0.2718* -0.1367* 0.1346* -0.1931* 0.6618* 0.6543* 0.6143* 0.3126* 0.6777*
Out-migration (85+)  0.0095 -0.0698* -0.1565* 0.2506* -0.1296* 0.1203* -0.1949* 0.3340* 0.3324* 0.3344* 0.1929* 0.3599*


















Out-migration (55-64)  1             
Out-migration (65-74)  0.7761*  1          
Out-migration (75-84)  0.6629*  0.6591*  1       
Out-migration (85+)  0.3233*            0.3189* 0.4499* 1
Out-migration (65+)  0.7606*          0.8687* 0.8819* 0.6546* 1
Notes: All variables are in logarithms. * denotes statistical significance at 5 percent.    
References 
 
American Association of Retired Persons. 2004. “Political Behavior and Values Across the  
Generations: A Summary of Selected Findings,” AARP Strategic Issues Research, July. 
 
Anselin, Luc. 1988. Spatial Econometrics:  Methods and Models. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic  
Publishers. 
 
Baicker, Katherine. 2005. “The Spillover Effects of State Spending.” Journal of Public 
Economics. Vol. 89, No. 2-3: 529-544. 
 
Bearse, P., G. Glomm, and B. Ravikumar. 2000. “On the Political Economy of Means-Tested  
Education Vouchers,” European Economic Review, 44: 904-915. 
 
Brueckner, Jan and Luz Saavedra. 2001. “Do Local Governments Engage in Strategic Property-
Tax Competition?” National Tax Journal. Vol. 54, No. 2: 203-29. 
 
Bruce, Donald, D. Carroll, J. Deskins, and J. Rork. 2006. “Road to Ruin? A Spatial Analysis of  
State Infrastructure Spending,” available at 
http://web.utk.edu/~dbruce/bruce.carroll.deskins.rork.roadtoruin.pdf. 
 
Brunori, David. 2003. Local Tax Policy: A Federalist Perspective. Washington, D.C.: The Urban  
Institute Press. 
 
Buettner, Theiss. 2001. “Local Business Taxation and Competition for Capital: The Choice of 
the Tax Rate.” Regional Science and Urban Economics. Vol. 31, No. 2-3: 215-45. 
 
Button, James W. 1992. “A Sign of Generational Conflict: The Impact of Florida’s Aging Voters  
on Local School and Tax Referenda,” Social Science Quarterly 73 (4): 786-797. 
 
Button, James W. and Walter A. Rosenbaum. 1989. “Seeing Gray: School Bond Issues and the  
Aging in Florida,” Research on Aging 11 (2): 158-173. 
 
Case, Anne. 1993. “Interstate Tax Competition After TRA 86.” Journal of Policy Analysis and 
Management. Vol. 12, No. 1: 136-48. 
 
Case, Anne, James Hines and Harvey Rosen. 1993. “Budget Spillovers and Fiscal Policy 
Interdependence.” Journal of Public Economics. Vol. 52, No. 3: 285-307. 
 
Cebula, Richard J.  1990. "A Brief Empirical Note on the Tiebout Hypothesis and State Income 
Tax Policies." Public Choice.  Vol. 67, No. 1: 87-9.  
Cliff, A., Ord, J. 1981. Spatial Processes, Models, and Applications. London: Pion. 
 
Conway, Karen S. and Andrew J. Houtenville. 1998. “Do the Elderly ‘Vote with Their Feet’?”  
Public Choice 97 (4): 663-685. 
 
Conway, Karen S. and Andrew J. Houtenville. 2001. “Elderly Migration and State Fiscal Policy:  
  27   
Evidence from the 1990 Census Migration Flows,” National Tax Journal 54 (1): 103-
123. 
 
Conway, Karen Smith and Andrew J. Houtenville. 2003. “Out with the Old, In with the Old: A  
Closer Look at Younger versus Older Elderly Migration.” Social Science Quarterly 84 
No 2: 309-28. 
 
Conway, Karen S. and Jonathan C. Rork. 2004. “Diagnosis Murder: The Death of State Death  
Taxes,” Economic Inquiry 42 (4): 537-559. 
 
Conway, Karen Smith and Jonathan C. Rork. 2006. “State ‘Death’ Taxes and Elderly Migration  
— The Chicken or the Egg?” National Tax Journal, Volume LIX, No. 1, available at 
http://pubpages.unh.edu/~ksconway/NTJ_Conway_Rork_Finalv.pdf. 
 
Deller, Steven C. and Norman Walzer. 1993. “The Effects of an Aging Rural Population on the  
Financing of Rural Public Education,” Journal of Research in Rural Education 9 (2): 
104-114. 
 
Elhorst, J. Paul. 2003. “Specification and Estimation of Spatial Panel Data Models.”  
International Regional Science Review, 26 (3): 244-268. 
 
Farnham, Martin and Purvi Sevak. 2002. “Local Fiscal Policy and Retiree Migration: Evidence  
from the Health and Retirement Study,” manuscript. 
 
Figlio, David, Koplin, Van W. and William Reid. 1999. “Do States Play Welfare Games?” 
Journal of Urban Economics. Vol. 46, No. 3: 437-54. 
 
Fournier, Gary M., David W. Rasmussen, and William J. Serow. 1988. “Elderly Migration as a  
Response to Economic Incentives.” Social Science Quarterly 69 No.2: 245-260. 
 
Gale, L.R. and W.C. Heath. 2000. "Elderly Internal Migration in the United States Revisted,"  
Public Finance Review. 
 
Gradstein, Mark and Michael Kaganovich. 2004. “Aging Population and Education Finance,”  
Journal of Public Economics 88 (12): 2469-2485. 
 
Harris, Amy R., William N. Evans and Robert M. Schwab. 2001. “Education Spending in an  
Aging America,” Journal of Public Economics 81 (3): 449-472. 
 
He, Wan and Jason P. Schachter. 2003. “Internal Migration of the Older Population: 1995 to  
2000” Census 2000 Special Reports CENSR-10, U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. 
Census Bureau. 
 
Heyndels, Bruno and Jef Vuchelen. 1998. "Tax Mimicking Among Belgian Municipalities." 
National Tax Journal. Vol. 51, No. 1: 89-101. 
 
Holtz-Eakin, Douglas J., Mary E. Lovely and Mehmet S. Tosun. 2004. “Generational Conflict,  
Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth,” Journal of Macroeconomics 26 (1): 1-23. 
  28   
 
Ladd, Helen F. and Sheila E. Murray. 2001. “Intergenerational Conflict Reconsidered: County  
  Demographic Structure and the Demand for Public Education,” Economics of Education 
 Review 20 (4): 343-357. 
 
LeSage J. P. (1999). Applied Econometrics using MATLAB. Manuscript, Dept. of Economics,  
University of Toronto. 
 
Newbold, K. B. 1996. Determinants of elderly interstate migration in the United States, 1985– 
1990. Research on Aging, 18,451-476. 
 
Poterba, James M. 1997. “Demographic Structure and the Political Economy of Public  
Education,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 16 (1): 48-66. 
 
Poterba, James M. 1998. “Demographic Change, Intergenerational Linkages, and Public  
Education,” American Economic Review 88 (2): 315-320. 
 
Razin, A., E. Sadka and P. Swagel. 2002. “The Aging Population and the Size of the Welfare  
State,” Journal of Political Economy 110 (4): 900-918. 
 
Reeder, Richard J. and Nina L. Glasgow. 1990. “Nonmetro Retirement Counties’ Strengths and  
Weaknesses,” Rural Development Perspectives (February): 12-17. 
 
Revelli, Federico. 2001. “Spatial Patterns in Local Taxation: Tax Mimicking or Error 
Mimicking?” Applied Economics. Vol. 33, No. 9: 1101-07. 
 
Rork, Jonathan. 2003. “Coveting Thy Neighbors’ Taxation.” National Tax Journal. Vol. 56, No. 
4: 775-787.  
 
Rosenbaum, Walter A. and James W. Button. 1989. “Is There Gray Peril?: Retirement Politics in  
Florida,” The Gerontologist 29 (3): 300-306. 
 
Saavedra, Luz. 2000. “A Model of Welfare Competition with Evidence from AFDC.” Journal of 
Urban Economics. Vol. 47, No. 2: 248-79. 
 
Serow, William J., Douglas A. Charity, Gary M. Fournier, and David W. Rasmussen. 1986.  
“Cost of Living Differentials and Elderly Interstate Migration.” Research on Aging 8 No. 
2: 317-327. 
 
Slavov, Sita Nataraj. 2006. "Age Bias in Fiscal Policy: Why Does the Political Process Favor the  
Elderly?," Topics in Theoretical Economics: Vol. 6 : Iss. 1, Article 11, available at 
http://www.bepress.com/bejte/topics/vol6/iss1/art11. 
 
Tosun, Mehmet S. 2008. “Endogenous Fiscal Policy and Capital Market Transmissions in the 
Presence of Demographic Shocks.” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 32 (6):  
2031-2060. 
 
Tosun, Mehmet S. 2005. “Global Aging and Fiscal Policy with International Labor Mobility: A  
  29   
Political Economy Perspective,” IMF Working Paper 05/140.  Washington, D.C.: IMF. 
 
Tosun, Mehmet S. 2003. “Population Aging and Economic Growth: Political Economy and  
Open Economy Effects,”2003 (December). Economics Letters 81 (3): 291-296. 
 
Voss, P., Gunderson, R., Manchin, R. 1988. Death taxes and elderly interstate migration.  
Research on Aging, 10,420-450. 
 
 
  30